

*United States Marine Corps  
School of Advanced Warfighting  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

## **MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES**

TRAINING & EDUCATION'S IMPACT ON 2020 OFFICER CAREER PROGRESSION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
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**AUTHOR: STEPHEN K. VAN RIPER,  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Joint warfare and the participation of other elements of military power are increasingly being applied at lower and lower levels to the extent that functions formerly considered the purview of senior commander are being taken up by combat leaders of much lower rank and experience. The challenge today is to create a *second training and educational revolution* that prepares our military leaders to fight in the new age of warfare. (MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret))<sup>1</sup>

The world is increasingly complex. Technology, changing social structures, dynamic political environments, and mounting globalization have created environments that are drastically different than 15, 10 or even 5 years ago. Today's leaders are making decisions that involve appreciably more variables than did their predecessors. Current events are forcing Marine Corps officers to learn, think and make decisions in arenas that they have not been trained in such as economics, diplomacy, psychology, information and perception management, city management, etcetera. As this trend continues the next generation of Marine Corps officers will find themselves in a multifaceted environment that can barely be imagined today. The Marine Corps is adapting to this demand and making decisions that influence what the officer of 2020 will look like. As the Corps attempts to manage tomorrow's force, adjustments will be made in the Force Management framework of DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities). If the Corps attempts a "second training and educational revolution" that occurrence will impact the other elements of the DOTMLPF, most significantly *Personnel* and the personnel system. As a component of this system, officers' career paths will be necessarily and dramatically altered by 2020

## **CAPABILITIES DETERMINATION**

The five rights are "putting the right Marine, in the right place, at the right time, with the right **skills**, who retains the right quality of life." (LtGen Gary L. Parks – Deputy Commandant, Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs Branch in 2003)<sup>2</sup>

Today, two sets of documents articulate the right *skills* that LtGen Parks refers to. These skills are *capabilities* that the Marine Corps has deemed necessary to accomplish its assigned roles and missions.<sup>3</sup> Marine Corps Training and Readiness (T&R) Manuals list all of the capabilities that Marine Corps individuals and units are desired to possess at specific times in their careers or during unit rotation cycles. Each Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) has a T&R Manual that defines those capabilities that Marines in that field are expected to possess as they advance through their careers. (See Enclosure 1.) The capabilities lists are long and it is impossible for any Marine to be thoroughly proficient in all of the skills assigned for his rank and position throughout his career. Therefore, commanders use a second set of documents, Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs), to focus Marines on those capabilities that are deemed *most* important for the expected future missions of each unit. (See Enclosure 2.) Writing a METL is a challenging task that involves gazing into the future and determining what will be important and when.

As the operating environment becomes progressively more complex, commanders are having greater difficulty culling the T&R lists down to one ‘essential’ METL with any degree of accuracy. And, they are finding that the list of necessary capabilities is *growing*. In 2003, as 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division prepared to return to Iraq for Security and Stability Operations (SASO) it found that its units required 21 skills which were either not in the T&R manual or which required important adjustments to how the skills were performed. (Enclosure 3.) The USMC Concepts and Programs publication of 2005 indicates, “Increased schooling in small wars – counterinsurgency, counter-terror, coalition operations, and interagency issues – as well as urban operations training is needed.”<sup>4</sup> The Marine Corps’ growing requirements for enhanced cultural

awareness, improved language skills, negotiation skills, and the use of new technologies further lengthens the capabilities lists found in its T&R manuals.

Marines are also finding they need many of the T&R listed capabilities earlier in their careers than did their predecessors. Major General Robert H. Scales, USA (Ret), while writing on Future War, stated, “While wars have become more complex, responsibility for those who fight them has increasingly slipped down the chain of command.”<sup>5</sup> What was once the purview of senior officers is rapidly becoming required of junior officers and Marines. The T&R manuals don’t reflect that reality and adjustments are already being studied. By 2020 it can reasonably be expected that Marine Corps’ T&R manuals, and the METLs that commanders derive from them, will be notably different both in the volume and the distribution of the capabilities within them.

## **CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT**

Developing any capability requires a combination of three elements – Training, Education & Experience (T&E&E)<sup>6</sup>. *Training* is defined by the Marine Corps as “the conduct of instruction, discipline, or drill; the building in of information and procedures; and the progressive repetition of tasks – the product of which is skill development and proficiency.”<sup>7</sup> In other words, training is the development of the *science* of war. Education, on the other hand, is about developing the *art* of war. It is defined by Marine Corps Order as “the process of moral and mental development; the drawing out of students to initiate the learning process and bring their own interpretations and energies to bear - the product of which is a creative mind.”<sup>8</sup> However, the science of adult education has advanced beyond these simple distinctions. “Learning science has...evolved to a point where the distinction between training and education has become blurred. The two are often now combined in several important aspects.”<sup>9</sup> And as andragogy (the

field of adult education) has developed, other elements of learning have emerged as equally important. One is experience. Malcolm Knowles, a father of adult education, asserted that experience was one of the most vital elements in the process, and its role has been confirmed by thirty years of research.<sup>10</sup>

Determining the precise blend of Training, Education & is capability specific. The capability to accurately fire a rifle entails different ratios of T&E&E than does the capability to conduct SASO in a remote village. Finding the balance between the three is challenging. A critical piece of that challenge is determining the time required to develop and maintain a capability. Identifying time requirements is vital because time is a zero-sum game. With finite time available, and as the capabilities required of the 2020 Marine increase, the Corps will be required to use time more efficiently or somehow ‘find’ more of it.

The current limit on available Marine Corps time is approximately 1 ½ billion hours per year.<sup>11</sup> These man-hours represent the time available to a 178,000 man Marine Corps. Hours are divided between developing, operating, and maintaining the force. An increase in one area decreases the available time in the others. Once time is apportioned between operations, maintenance and development, it must be further allocated between T&E&E components.

### **SOLUTION APPROACHES**

Today’s officer corps is straining under the weight of increasing T&R requirements and lengthening METLs. If trends continue, tomorrow’s officers will find it impossible to comply with the unit METLs necessary to succeed in the world of 2020. There are six possible solutions to this dilemma:



1) Reprioritize capability sets and discard those skills that insufficient time make unachievable. Some 2005 skills will be lost in order to develop and maintain new skills. This is often referred to as “rebalancing.”

2) Reallocate available hours/days/weeks by reducing operational or maintenance time in order to gain T&E&E time.

3) Use current training and education time more efficiently.

4) “Buy” more T&E&E time by increasing personnel endstrength.

5) Capitalize on investments by retaining the right officers longer.

6) Access new officers who already possess needed skills thereby saving ‘on the clock’ T&E&E requirements.

In order to succeed Marine Corps planners need to implement one or more of these approaches.

### **Reprioritizing**

As the world changes, as commanders turnover, and as leaders adapt to the strengths, weaknesses and current capabilities of their units, reprioritization will occur. It is a constant. In 1940, mule packing, leather polishing, and the use of Higgins boats were included on commanders’ METLs. These skills are no longer high priority, having been replaced with such skills as Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, vehicle maintenance, and Security & Stability Operations (SASO). The capabilities that will be necessary in 2020 are difficult to predict but if the past and present are any indication reprioritization will not completely solve the time-to-capabilities dilemma.

As the 2005 Force Structure Review Group report demonstrates, reprioritization has significant ripple effects. A decision to increase infantry capabilities required the Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) branch of the Marine Corps to make changes in personnel numbers in several MOSs (e.g. eliminate the Small Riverine Craft MOS), increase and decrease the numbers of instructors at schools, change the number of Marines in each rank required in some units (e.g. more Corporals, less Sergeants), adjust Tables of Organization, etcetera. Each of these changes

involves risk but is a necessary step to ensuring relevant capabilities are built and nurtured within the Marine Corps.

### **Reallocating**

Easier said than done, shifting man-hours from operations or maintenance is a tough fight. Today's warriors are busy and finding time for Training and Education is becoming increasingly difficult. The U.S. Army's Command & General Staff College has started the last two courses with empty seats. Leaders, including the Secretary of Defense, often ponder eliminating or reducing PME time in order to find more trigger-pullers for a fully occupied military. Increased Operational Tempo (OPTEMO) brings with it increased Maintenance Tempo. Neither of these tempos shows any sign of slowing down and indications forecast an increase over the next 15 years. This pull in two directions may actually compress the time for T&E&E in future years, rather than permitting it to increase. Changing the ratio of operational to T&E time within officers' careers and unit schedules would come at the cost of readying fewer available operational units for the nation. This would equate to greater qualified but less accessible Marine units – not something likely to please a Regional Combatant Commander or Pentagon planner.

### **Efficiency**

How the Marine Corps trains and educates people has changed in the last 20 years. Andragogy has grown considerably since the 1970s and the Marine Corps has reaped the benefits of advances in the field. Distance learning, improved instructional techniques, and a better understanding of how adults learn have reduced the training and education time necessary to give many Marines the required capabilities.

There are three methods that may allow continued increases in educational efficiency:

- Improve the speed at which people learn
- Reduce the inefficiencies and “lost” time in the training and education process
- Achieve greater benefit from each T&E investment made.

*Andragogy* is about understanding and improving how adults learn. Employing the methods developed by andragogy may reduce T&E time. It is a rapidly developing field and one from which the military can benefit greatly as Marine PME programs adjust and evolve.

Reducing inefficiencies in the Marine Corps’ current personnel system won’t be easy. To understand the challenges, four terms must be understood:

The *Table of Organization (T/O)* identifies the quantity of Marines necessary for the Marine Corps to accomplish its mission within the national defense strategy. In essence it is a list of every job that needs to be filled and where that job resides. In October 2005 the Marine Corps saw a need for 16,169 Marines.<sup>12</sup>

*Endstrength* is the number of Marines that manpower planners anticipate having on the Marine Corps’ rolls at the end of the fiscal year. The official endstrength in October of 2005 was 18,708.<sup>13</sup>


*T2P2* are the ‘overhead’ Marines in the manpower system. T2P2 stands for Transients, Training, Patients and Prisoners. Because the Marine Corps cannot fill a T/O billet with Marines who are in one of these categories, they are considered operationally ‘unusable.’ Historically, T2P2 is 17% of the Marine Corps endstrength. In October 2005 that equated to 3,142 Marines.

The *Authorized Strength Report (ASR)* is the document that details how many usable Marines the Marine Corps plans to “buy” that year. Constrained by budget, law, and policy decisions it’s numbers indicate what should be available to apply toward unit T/Os in the next year. In Oct 2005 this number was 15,566 Marines. Although the Marine Corps has 2,539 more Marines than required to fill the T/O, the Marines in T2P2 keep the ASR number *below* its T/O need. (Figure 1)<sup>14</sup>



# Marine Corps Numbers

(October 2005)



(FIGURE 1)

Reducing inefficiencies involves correcting the mismatch between the ASR and T/O, in essence reducing T2P2. Reducing T2P2 requires change of existing Marine Corps' policies and practices.

Training. A reduction in training and education is a mistake. Major General Scales predicts "close combat soldiers need more time to develop to peak fighting efficiency than their industrial age antecedents. Years, not months, are required to produce a close combat soldier with the requisite skills and attributes to do the increasingly more difficult and dangerous tasks that await him in the future."<sup>15</sup> Although efficiencies in educational techniques will speed transmission and reception, today's educational experts realize that the role which experience plays in the learning dynamic means that speed in transmission does not always equal proficiency in learning. Some skills simply need time to mature. As skills involving experience (e.g. negotiating with civilian leaders) become required of junior Marines, the time investments required to develop capabilities in 2020 will skyrocket.

Transients. Of the T2P2 categories, this area appears the most promising. Students waiting for schools and Marines traveling to and from schools are two of M&RA's biggest contributors to T2P2. Poor planning and the requirement to wait until sufficient pools of students build up before starting a class contribute to most of the 'dead time.' The Basic School (TBS), where Lieutenants receive their initial training, is a prime example. Lieutenants often spend weeks in a holding company waiting to start training. Upon graduation, many also wait *again* until enough TBS classes have graduated to build a large enough group with which to start an MOS training course. This period exists because the Marine Corps spreads MOSs across TBS classes vice consolidating them in specific companies. An illustration is the Marine Corps' Officer Communications Course. This course is located on the same base as TBS and conducts two lieutenant classes per year. TBS conducts six. Since Communications students are spread among the six TBS classes, lieutenants often wait a number of months, after graduation to begin their school.<sup>16</sup> In the course of a year, this equates to man-years<sup>17</sup> of available manpower lost to the system. The solution: consolidate quotas in the TBS classes so that graduation dates correspond to MOS school commencement dates.

Another method to reduce transient numbers is to increase distance learning. The Marine Corps already provides Professional Military Education (PME) to a majority of its officers through correspondence courses. Studies show that distance learning, when combined with technological teaching aids, can dramatically reduce the time it takes to *train* personnel. "[Some] studies demonstrate as much as 50 percent or more reduction in time needed to learn, compared to conventional delivery."<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, quality *education* and *experience* are still difficult to achieve with distance learning's tools and techniques.

Needs Alignment. Lastly, achieving greater benefit from each T&E investment requires tying investment to *need*. Currently the Marine Corps sends students to PME courses (e.g. Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff, School of Advanced Warfighting) based on the number of available seats in the facility or the number of students that the staff can effectively instruct. No link is established between the number of school-trained officers the Marine Corps *needs* and what it *produces*.

If resident and nonresident PME were equivalent, as Marine Corps policy currently states, the Marine Corps Manpower system would have long ago shut down all resident PME schools in order to reduce T2P2 and increase manpower in operational units. However, the Marine Corps obviously benefits from having school-trained officers. The Marine Corps should determine what that benefit is, how much of it is needed to fit required capabilities, and how to address overages or shortfalls. Sending 190 Majors to spend 10 months in resident school may be too many, or may not be enough. Identifying the *requirement* vice the *throughput capability* could save untold man-years.

### **“Buying” time**

Debate among policy makers regularly revolves around how much capability the nation needs. After wringing inefficiencies out of the system this problem boils down to money. Each capability has a price tag and the balancing of the two is the perpetual debate.

T&E&E incur a multitude of costs: facilities, training aids, instructor fees, ammunition, students’ pay, housing, student and instructor subsistence, and etcetera. Depending on the T&E&E required to develop and maintain a capability, the price tag changes. Training a private to shoot has a different cost than educating and providing experience to a Lieutenant Colonel for SASO operations.

Although the Marine Corps is *authorized* by Congress to recruit and maintain a certain number of Marines, what really determines the size, composition, and capabilities of the Corps is how much corresponding money Congress provides. For Fiscal Year 2006 the Marine Corps is authorized 184,000 Marines, however it expects funding for approximately 181,000. Because “buying” colonels is more expensive than “buying” privates, coordinating T&E&E to fit capability requirements must include the structuring of grade ratios and the budget. The final numbers the Marine Corps will actually “buy” will be balanced between what grade structure is deemed necessary and what is procurable.

This method of adding capabilities obviously requires adding money to the manpower budget. Whether this is a viable option for Marine Corps planners is an important question. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended cutting the Marine Corps to 175,000, while General Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, recommended maintaining an 180,000 man force in early 2006. This debate will continue into the foreseeable future and will always be the largest determiner of Marine Corps capabilities and officer structure.

### **Capitalizing on Investment**

There is one wrinkle in the capabilities vs cost equation that causes discussion and can alter officer career patterns. “Buying” fewer people could actually increase the Marine Corps’ available capabilities if carefully orchestrated. The United States and the Marine Corps have made several decisions that diminish the available benefit the Corps receives from each T&E&E investment. Reversing those decisions could increase the dividend of T&E&E significantly by 2020. Those decisions are: career length, generalization, augmentation and degree requirements.

Career Length. In restricting officer careers to thirty years and inducing large quantities of Marine Officers to leave at twenty years, decades of T&E&E investment walks out

the door at a time when the Corps senior officers are in the prime of their complex decision making abilities. Civilian companies value their upper-level managers so highly that they offer higher salaries and attractive promotions to encourage retention well past the thirty-year mark. Field Grade officers are not ‘expended rounds’ at 30 years. Many have decades of productive years left that the Marine Corps could capitalize on. In fact, “compared with career patterns in other militaries, the American officer career is quite short.”<sup>19</sup>

Generalization. “For officers, the system was designed to favor generalists over specialists.”<sup>20</sup> This means that the services bounce officers from job to job in order to ensure a wide breadth of experience before they become senior decision makers. The idea is that *experience* is vital to decision making and therefore must be cultivated. While this is true, the overall benefit from exploiting broad experience may not outweigh the benefits of focused experience or using an officer’s training to its maximum potential. Little to no effort is expended to ensure that an officer’s training is optimally utilized. For example, an aviator sent to safety school may be placed in a safety billet for as little as two months. There are no mechanisms to ensure the Marine Corps reaps the maximum benefit that PME schools provide beyond ensuring the officer stays in the Corps for two additional years. While EWS focuses on educating captains “in order to enable them to command or to serve as a primary staff officer in their MOS”<sup>21</sup> there is no requirement that an EWS graduate return to the operating forces where he would either command or serve as a primary staff officer. An EWS graduate could complete a school, serve two years in a recruiting command and depart the Marine Corps having never used the PME he was provided *in order to serve the Marine Corps*.

Augmentation. Eliminating the augmentation process dropped one of the early gates through which officers passed. It ensured that the Marine Corps kept only the brightest and



best. One reason the process was eliminated was due to inequalities between officers of different commissioning sources. Reserve Officer Training Command and the Naval Academy produced officers who were allowed to bypass this gate. Officers from other commissioning sources were often required to leave the Marine Corps despite the fact they might have been better officers than some who bypassed the gate. To eliminate the inequality the gate was removed.

Reestablishing this gate to officers' careers (and ensuring all officers passed through) would allow the Corps to remove slow learners or those incompatible with the Marine Corps' needs.<sup>22</sup>

Degree Requirements. The Marine Corps invests money and time into many officer candidates before they become lieutenants. Yet aside from ensuring they receive a degree and the training required for initial officer screening (at Officer Candidate School) no focus is given to ensure their degree brings benefit to the Marine Corps. Officer candidates are allowed to pursue any degree they desire. While valuable to the individual, an officer who graduates with a leisure management degree may bring breadth of knowledge, but not much usable skill to the Marine Corps.

### **“Prior to the Clock” Acquisition**

Once an officer enters the Marine Corps as a lieutenant any T&E&E he acquires is “on the clock.” Even after duty-hours education is either planned as *development* time or taken out of *maintenance* time (e.g. family time, rest time, etc.) at the expense of other activities. Since the Marine Corps is a 24/7 affair, any off-the-clock training, education, or experience must come before the officer crosses the threshold into the Marine Corps. In other words, he or she must acquire it during high school or college. The 2020 Marine Corps could increase its capabilities by guiding pre-commissioning time to benefit the Corps.

Studies are underway to determine the feasibility of including language training in pre-commissioning training and education but language is merely the tip of the iceberg. If planned correctly the Marine Corps could link college degree to MOS selection and gain tremendously. Placing officers with management degrees into acquisitions or supply, or officers with mechanical training into motor transport, would increase the officers' initial 'useable' capabilities. Brought to fruition this concept could increase the Marine Corps experience base and reduce the necessary on-the-clock training requirements enough to gain significant timesavings.

### **RIPPLES AND CONSEQUENCES**

None of the options presented come easily or without cost, especially in a system as complex as the Department of Defense. All recommendations incur challenges, obstacles and ripple effects that must be reconciled. Extending officers' careers ages the force – which may not be beneficial in a highly demanding occupation known for physical challenges and taxing mental endurance. Optimizing school-to-billet linkages may deny some organizations the trained personnel that bring creative spark to their endeavors. Screening out young officers with augmentation gates would require additional accession, increase initial T&E school seat requirement to refill the officer pool, increase emphasis on fitness reporting, and change how Manpower Division shapes grades and MOSs. Since only sixty percent of officer candidates are in pre-commissioning programs, requiring language (or other) training from them may inspire a “have-have not” dynamic since the remaining forty percent of officer candidates may not have the same skills. There are no easy solutions in the dynamic between T&E&E and personnel management. Any pebble in the pond ripples through the entire system.

## **CONCLUSION**

The US military must overcome the way it has trained and educated leaders. Defense officials are moving ahead to overcome Cold-War era training to create a new generation of leaders who aren't constrained by what the doctrine says.<sup>23</sup>

This 2005 quote by D.E. Vandergrift was in a final report on how the U.S. Army must restructure its officer accession training to meet expanding educational needs for today's fight. It is just as true as the Marine Corps shapes the officer corps of 2020. Although it is difficult if not impossible to predict what capabilities, and therefore what T&E&E will be required by 2020, it is understood that it will require more overall development time to build a relevant force. The variables that shape the capabilities of the 2020 officer seem few but the interactions between them are complex and dynamic. Considerable study is needed to ensure future readiness. Mindsets must be adjusted, policies must be changed, and important manpower decisions must be made to shape the lieutenant of 2020. That lieutenant will have a very different career than today's officer. It's up to today's planners to ensure that career is successful and relevant to our Nation's security.

7060. INDEX OF COLLECTIVE EVENTS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

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ENCLOSURE 1

**GTB MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTS (METL), APPROVED BY THE  
ASSOCIATED COMMUNITY, AND USED TO DEVELOP T&R MANUALS**

**Reconnaissance**

1. Plan, coordinate, and conduct amphibious/ground reconnaissance and surveillance to observe, identify, and report enemy activity, and collect other information of military significance.
2. Conduct specialized reconnaissance. Assist in specialized engineer, nuclear, biological, chemical, radio, mobile, and other unique reconnaissance missions.
3. Conduct initial terminal guidance (ITG) for helicopters, landing craft, and parachutists.
4. Designate and engage selected targets with force fires and other operations to support battlespace shaping. This includes terminal guidance of precision-guided munitions.
5. Conduct post-strike reconnaissance to determine and report battle damage to a specified target or area.
6. Conduct limited scale raids.
7. Conduct Counter-Reconnaissance
8. Conduct insertion and extraction of reconnaissance forces in support of reconnaissance operations.
9. Conduct other operations as directed by the supported commander.
10. Implant and/or recover sensors and beacons

**Assault Amphibious Vehicle**

1. Maneuver assault elements during the ship-to-shore movement of other amphibious operations.
2. Provide tactical mobility to assault elements in mechanized or other combat support operations during subsequent operations ashore.
3. Provide special staff augmentation and support for the planning and coordination of mechanized and amphibious operations.
4. Direct and coordinate internal command, control, and support actions for the entire AA Battalion.
5. Provide the organic command and control systems support for designated units.
6. Provide organic maintenance and logistics support to assault amphibian units.
7. Provide fire support within the capability of the organic weapon systems.
8. Provide support in the clearing of lanes through minefields and other obstacles during combat operations.

ENCLOSURE 2

# **1stMARDIV SASO TASK-CONDITION-STANDARDS LIST**

## **THEMES**

- CG'S "FLAT ASS RULES"
- BEHAVIOR THEMES

## **OVERARCHING**

- IDENTIFY IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED)
- COUNTER KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IED
- REACT TO AN IED DETONATION
  - APPREHEND/DETAIN INDIGEONOUS PERSONNEL

## **OFFENSE**

- PERFORM A CORDON AND SEARCH / HOUSEVISIT
- SEARCH A BUILDING
- QUICK REACTION FORCE REINFORCEMENT OF SQUAD-SIZED PATROLS
- PLATOON QUICK REACTION FORCE REINFORCEMENT IN GS OF BATTALION
  - CONDUCT AN ASSAULT ON A FORTIFIED URBAN POSITION

## **DEFENSE**

- OCCUPY A DELIBERATE FIRM BASE
- EXECUTE A HASTY FIRM BASE (GO FIRM, COMPANY COIL, ETC)
- CONDUCT CONTINUING ACTIONS IN A FIRM BASE
- ESTABLISH & MAINTAIN INTERNAL FIRM BASE QUICK REACTION FORCE (QRF)

## **PATROLLING**

- CONDUCT A DISMOUNTED PATROL DURING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS (SASO)
- CONDUCT A MOUNTED PATROL DURING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS (SASO)

## **CONVOY / MOUNTED COMBAT PATROL**

- CONDUCT AND/OR ESCORT CONVOY OR MOUNTED COMBAT PATROL OF FOUR OR MORE VEHICLES FROM ORIGIN TO DESTINATION DURING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS (SASO).

## **CHECKPOINTS**

- ESTABLISH AND OPERATE AN ENTRY CONTROL POINT (ECP) / VEHICLE CHECK POINT (VCP / SNAP, HASTY OR DELIBERATE) / PERSONNEL CHECK POINT (PCP)

## **CROWD MANAGEMENT / CONTROL**

- REACT TO CIVIL DISTURBANCE

## **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

- CONDUCT MEDICAL CIVIL ACTION PROGRAM (MEDCAP) AS PART OF SECURITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROJECTS (COMREL) AS PART OF SECURITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
- DELIVER SUPPLIES OR HUMANITARIAN AID

ENCLOSURE 3

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<sup>1</sup> McIvor A.D. (2005). Rethinking the Principles of War. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, Maryland. Chapter 2 by MG Robert H. Scales (USA, Ret).

<sup>2</sup> Parks, Garry L., Manpower--shaping combat power for today and tomorrow. *Marine Corps Gazette*; Feb 2003; p. 16

<sup>3</sup> The term most often found in Marine Corps publications and articles when referring to the 'skills' LtGen Parks writes about is 'capabilities.' Relatively synonymous with 'skills' this paper will use the common vernacular of 'capabilities' in line with Marine Corps leadership's views on terminology.

<sup>4</sup> United States Marine Corps. USMC Concepts & Programs 2005. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 2005. p.11

<sup>5</sup> McIvor, A.D., p.43.

<sup>6</sup> T&E&E is not an official Marine Corps Acronym. It has been developed by the author for the purposes of this paper.

<sup>7</sup> Marine Corps Order 1553.1B – Marine Corps Training and Education System. Signed 24 May 91. p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> McIvor, A.D., p. 42.

<sup>10</sup> Merriam, S.B., Brockett, R.G. (1997). The Profession and Practice of Adult Education: An Introduction. San Francisco: Josey-Bass. P. 135

<sup>11</sup> Note: 24 hours times 365 days times 177,479 Marines (2005 endstrength per USMC Concepts & Programs 2005) equals 1,554,716,040 man-hours.

<sup>12</sup> Discussion between M&RA planners and the author during November 2005

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Beyond these four terms are a host of concepts and terms that more closely define how the Marine Corps will staff its billets. The GAR, 'staffing goals,' 'inventory' are just a few. These terms and concepts are not discussed in an effort to maintain clarity. Simplification of the four terms has occurred for the same reason.

<sup>15</sup> McIvor A.D. (2005). Rethinking the Principles of War. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, Maryland. Chapter 2 by MG Robert H. Scales (USA, Ret). p. 49.

<sup>16</sup> This example is the second largest contributor to officer T2P2. Officers awaiting flight training is the largest.

<sup>17</sup> A *man-year* is defined as one Marine doing a job for one year. A man-year can be constructed by one Marine over the course of a year, or by 12 Marines over the course of one month.

<sup>18</sup> Murdock, C.A., Flourney, M.A., & Campbell, K.M. (Jul 2005) Beyond GoldWaters-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). p. 120. Digital Equipment Corporation reported saving 40 percent of training time by using multimedia instead of traditional classroom teaching. IBM marketing education division reported timesavings of 40 percent. Federal Express saved 60 percent of training time.

<sup>19</sup> Williams, Cindy, Filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System. The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. 2004., p. 15.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p 9.

<sup>21</sup> Expeditionary Warfare School Website. Retrieved on Nov 30 from <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/ews/>

<sup>22</sup> The Marine Corps is currently reestablishing this gate. Due to new laws requiring all officers to enter the service as *regular* officers, this gate can no longer be an 'augmentation' process since 'augmentation' was from reserve to regular. The gate's new title is 'Career Designation Board' and the result is the same – Officers not selected leave active duty and join the reserves. All Lieutenants go through this process thereby removing the inequities described above.

<sup>23</sup> Vandegriff, D.E. (Aug 2005). BOLC Gap Analysis – Results. Power Point Presentation titled "Vandegriff\_Gap\_Results." Comments come from General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made in a speech in September 2004